This article originally appeared in the Independent - you can read the full article here.
When I travelled to Taiwan in 2022 we didn't publicise our delegation for security reasons. But the Chinese Government, it appears, knew.
As such revelations China’s Ministry of State Security has been conducting intelligence operations against Parliamentarians and all those with influence over Government policy are no surprise.
Some have questioned why China is investing in these operations. Quite simply, it is about diminishing the UK’s ability to be resilient to Chinese influence and objectives.
The Chinese Communist Party still feels the so-called "century of humiliation" acutely. All out resistance to foreign influence is embedded into its consciousness and this continues to shape both its foreign policy and military doctrine.
Never again must a foreign power be able to diminish China's ambitions (no matter how aggressive), and for Xi Jinping that means ensuring the UK - and the international rules-based system, which he perceives as biased against China and a form of Western imperialism - is neutralised.
Neutralised, that is, in its ability to intervene in Chinese affairs, and to limit Xi’s ability to achieve the Great Rejuvenation of China, an imperialist ambition he is pursuing as his great legacy - his place in the history books.
To understand how China pursues this goal, we need to understand how its government functions. There is no separation between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese state. Membership of the party is a must to achieve any form of significant office. Although we recognise Xi as President, in China he is most often referred to as General Secretary of the CCP because leadership of the party trumps leadership of the country.
The omnipotence of the CCP is mirrored in policy-making. China recently released its 15th five-year plan for social and economic development. We can draw a line from CCP policy to the hostile state activity endured by the UK.
Take intellectual property theft by Chinese companies operating in the UK. The CCP will identify key technologies of the future, which provincial governments then compete to produce. Every province in China has an intelligence agency with domestic and international wings whose job is to deliver the party's diktats.
The result is theft of British IP, heavily state subsidised production in China, over-production for the Chinese domestic market, artificially low pricing and the eventual flooding of UK markets with the product, stifling our domestic competitors.
We’ve seen this happen to German and American solar panel producers and now we are watching it play out in the battle for electric vehicle and battery global market share.
The one consistent policy of the CCP since the formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1948 has been to maintain dominance. This includes controlling the narrative, which Xi defines as "telling China’s story well". Any criticism of the CCP must be suppressed.
Again, we can draw a direct line from CCP central policy to incidents in our country. The reality facing innocent people living in Britain, be they Hong Kongers, Chinese dissidents or minorities such as Uyghurs or Tibetans, is the meting out of incessant transnational repression in the form of bounties and threats of kidnap.
Their experiences represent the extreme edge of CCP interference in the UK but are part of a wider pattern of hostility, stretching across society. This makes sense when placed into the context of CCP policy. They didn’t "tell China’s story well" and therefore are targets, regardless of UK law and diplomatic norms.
Recently, Chinese intelligence actors blackmailed Sheffield Hallam University into pulling research on human rights abuses in China. Despite this stifling of academic freedom, the Government still refuses to re-introduce the university free speech provisions the Conservative Party had enacted and they cancelled.
These are just some examples of many. So, what can we do to protect ourselves from such hostility?
First, we need to recognise and articulate the threat. Pretending we are dealing with a state like any other is no longer feasible. Labour must wake up and drop the act. This should start with China being put into the Enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme, which we introduced via the National Security Act in 2023. Labour voted for the legislation – why leave it on the shelf when our democracy has been attacked?
Secondly, we need to establish red lines. When the CCP carries out or encourages acts which damage our national and economic security, there must be a response. This is not sabre-rattling, it is deterrence and defence of our nation.
I have called for the Government to cancel its Joint Economic and Trade Commission talks with China (which we had suspended in 2019 due to concerns over human rights abuses in Hong Kong), to refuse the application for a new mega embassy in London (or at least force China to pay to re-route the sensitive underground cabling away from the embassy), to cancel visits by ministers to Beijing until sanctions against MPs are revoked, and to consider imposing sanctions on those responsible for running assets spying on British MPs.
Since the collapse of the China spy trial the Government’s response has been feeble. China’s second most senior diplomat at their UK embassy was simply called into the Foreign Office for a rhetorical rap on the knuckles by a senior official. This is no basis for establishing deterrence against future assaults on our democracy.
All of this is not to say that we cannot work with the Chinese state. But it is to say that we must compartmentalise the relationship, draw red lines, and pursue an unapologetic policy of deterrence, not least when it comes to actions on our shores.
Labour’s muddled kowtowing is hurting our national and economic security. Until it changes, we will face more revelations of espionage and the Chinese Communist Party will think our Government unwilling to defend our country.
